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The ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) is a construct that has potential to transform the mining 
sector internationally. The SLO is increasing in importance because it can reduce all risks 
during the energy project life-cycle that are detrimental to the success of energy projects. 
This paper analyses how SLO’s are at first perceived by interdisciplinary energy scholars 
before examining the legal nature of an SLO and looking at the effectiveness of such an 
agreement from the perspectives of both the energy company and the local community. In 
essence, this research seeks to address what is the legal basis of an SLO. Further, an original 
case study on Columbia is presented which highlights the SLO in action and its 
transformative effect. The paper also engages in new debates around the relationship of SLOs 
to related energy concepts such as the energy justice and environmental impact statements, 
which are also vital to energy infrastructure development. 
 
 

































At its simplest the ‘social licence to operate’ (SLO) refers to an energy company’s’ 
obligations to achieve societal acceptance of their activities.1 The SLO is an unwritten 
agreement between the company and communities (or stakeholders) in which societal support 
is required to enable the company’s legally-granted operations.  The SLO is in addition to the 
legal and/or environmental permit or licence granted to the energy company by the mineral or 
landholder.2   
 
While not exclusive to the natural resources sector,3 the SLO is most commonly associated 
with the extractive industries – the latter we define as including all energy resources, i.e. 
including natural resources, and oil, gas, coal.4  This association has been attributed to this 
industry sector due to the exploitative, and environmentally and socially damaging nature of 
natural resource exploration.5   
 
The SLO is often associated with the sites of activity and infrastructure location of energy 
projects.6  In this paper, “energy projects” and “resources projects” are projects within the 
energy life cycle – from natural resource extraction to decommissioning, and include fossil 
fuels and low carbon energy sources.7 However, SLO has also been used in terms of enabling 
entire industries to operate.  For example, the Australian Prime Minister recently stated, “The 
gas companies – I have no doubt – are very well aware they operate with the benefit of a 
social licence from the Australian people…And they cannot expect to maintain that if while 
billions of dollars of gas are being exported, Australians are left short.”8  This statement was 
made with regard to Australia’s liquefied natural gas (LNG) exporters choosing to export 
Australian gas rather than supply it to the domestic market.   
 
Failure to obtain the SLO can present operational risks that are detrimental to the success of 
energy projects. Public opposition to resources projects has been linked to project 
                                                          
1 The term SLO is not restricted to the energy sector.  In this article, we use the term ‘energy companies’ to 
include upstream (resource extraction and exploitation including project development) and downstream (energy 
delivery).  
2 Jason Prno, ‘An analysis of factors leading to the establishment of a social licence to operate in the mining 
industry’ (2013) 38 Resources Policy 577; Emma Wilson, ‘What is the social licence to operate? Local 
perceptions of oil and gas projects in Russia’s Komi Republic and Sakhalin Island’ (2016) 3(1) The Extractive 
Industries and Society 73.  
3 Geert Demuijnck and Bjorn Fasterling, ‘The Social Licence to Operate’ (2016) 136 Journal of Business Ethics 
675; Richard Parsons, Justine Lacey & Kieren Moffat, ‘Maintaining legitimacy of a contested practice: How the 
minerals industry understands its ‘social licence to operate’ (2014) 41 Resources Policy 83. 
4 Kieren Moffat et al., ‘The social licence to operate: a critical review’ (2016) 89(5) Forestry 477; Ibid, 
Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
5 Ibid, Moffat et al. 2016, 477 
6 See e.g., Rolf Wüstenhagen. Maarten Wolsink. Mary Jean Bürer. ‘Social acceptance of renewable energy 
innovation: An introduction to the concept’ (2007) 35(5) Energy Policy 2683; John Colton, et al., ‘Energy 
Projects, Social Licence, Public Acceptance and Regulatory Systems in Canada: A White Paper’ (2016) 
University of Calgary, The School of Public Policy, 9(20) SPP Research Papers, 34; Dan van der Horst, 
‘NIMBY or not? Exploring the relevance of location and the politics of voiced opinions in renewable energy 
siting controversies’ 35(5) Energy Policy 2705. 
7 See e.g., Ibid, Colton, et al, 2016, 34. 
8 Paul Karp, ‘Gas companies risk 'social licence' by failing to supply domestic market, Turnbull says’ (14 March 
2017) ABC News <www.theguardian.com/australia-news/2017/mar/15/gas-companies-risk-social-licence-by-
failing-to-supply-domestic-market-turnbull-says> accessed 17 May 2017.  
cancellations,9 resulting in significant financial consequences (as will be highlighted in the 
case study of Columbia later). A brief example, is the cancellation of a coal seam gas project 
in Queensland, Australia, (attributed to public opposition) resulted in a pre-tax write down of 
$600 million.10  Given the magnitude of the consequences arising from a company’s failure 
to obtain the SLO, it is not surprising that the SLO is beginning to be considered as the key 
risk in the mining sector.  EY (the global accounting firm) ranks the SLO has number 4 in its 
2016–2017 list of the top ten risks in the mining and minerals sector (it was ranked number 5 
in the previous year).11   
 
In the context of the energy sector from a holistic perspective, the SLO may be needed for 
any type of energy activity across the energy life-cycle; for the mining sector, it includes the 
mining life-cycle which includes, prospectors license, mining claim, lease of mine, advanced 
exploration, mineral production, rehabilitation of mine, closure plan and financial assurance. 
It will increase the practice of justice in the energy sector and increases the practice of 
distributional, procedural, recognition and restorative justice. In essence the SLO can play a 
significant role in ensuring energy justice exists and is applied for a given energy activity – 
energy justice can be defined simply as the application of human rights across the energy life-
cycle.12 As identified in the literature, the SLO will mainly operate and exist when the energy 
activity or infrastructure is in operation and when it is then decommissioned.13 
 
While in some of the social science literature, the SLO is viewed as external to the legal 
system, this notion is not entirely true, and it is fast emerging as a key legal contract (in a 
variety of forms) in order to begin operations for an energy company. Section 2 of this paper 
provides a brief introduction to the SLO construct. Section 3 examines the legal context of 
the SLO. Then a case study on the SLO and Columbia is presented and this provides 
significant originality in the exploration of this underexplored concept within energy 
literature. Columbia was chosen for three main reasons: (1) it represents a country from the 
Global South that has received limited attention in energy research; (2) it has significant 
mining resources and activities; and (3) there are unique but potentially far-reaching activities 
in relation to the SLO. Finally, the paper concludes and highlights the next steps forward for 
the SLO in the energy sector and links back to how it is now becoming a key tool in 
increasing the practice and application of energy justice in the energy sector. 
 
                                                          
9 See e.g., Financial Post Staff, ‘Arrested Development: A searchable database of billions of dollars in stalled or 
cancelled resource projects’ Financial Times (8 December 2016) 
<http://business.financialpost.com/news/energy/arrested-development-a-searchable-database-of-billions-worth-
of-stalled-blocked-and-cancelled-resource-projects> accessed 17 May 2017; ____, ‘Coal seam gas licences 
cancelled after AGL reaches buyback deal with NSW Government’ (6 July 2016) ABC News 
<www.abc.net.au/news/2015-07-06/agl-csg-licences-bought-back-hunter-sydney-illawarra/6597714> accessed 
17 May 2017; Bart W. Terwel, Emma ter Mors, Dancker D.L. Daamen, ‘It’s not only about safety: Beliefs and 
attitudes of 811 local residents regarding a CCS project in Barendrecht’ (2012) 9 International Journal of 
Greenhouse Gas Control 41. 
10 Peter Hannam, ‘AGL ditches Sydney CSG permit, but sticks with Gloucester project’ (6 July 2015) Sydney 
Morning Herald < www.smh.com.au/environment/agl-ditches-sydney-csg-permit-but-sticks-with-gloucester-
project-20150705-gi5s2c.html> accessed 17 May 2017. 
11 EY, ‘Top 10 business risks facing mining and metals, 2016–2017’ (2016) 
<www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/EY-business-risks-in-mining-and-metals-2016-2017/%24FILE/EY-
business-risks-in-mining-and-metals-2016-2017.pdf>.  
12 Heffron, R. J. and Talus. K. 2016. The Evolution of Energy Law and Energy Jurisprudence: Insights for Energy 
Analysts and Researchers. Energy Research and Social Science, 19, 1-10. 
13 Raphael J. Heffron and Darren McCauley, "The Concept of Energy Justice across the Disciplines," Energy 
Policy 105 (2017). 658-667 
The energy sector is increasingly aware of the need to ensure that practices are sustainable for 
the long term. This paper argues that SLO is the main mechanism for improving the 
sustainability of the extraction industries.14 Over 80% of the world’s energy sources come 
from fossil fuels that require sustainable extraction activities.15 The emergence of modern 
renewable energy is also closely associated with a high demand in extracted materials for the 
construction of wind turbines for solar panels.16 The effective application of energy justice 
principles in the extractive industries offers a major opportunity to ensure social acceptability 
and long-term environmental protection.  
 
SLO is undeniably emerging as a key mechanism for achieving the successful application of 
energy justice. The energy justice framework encourages companies to consider the impact of 
their activities from a whole systems perspective.17 It is not designed to reject or oppose 
ongoing activities such as the extractive industries. Its primary objective is to encourage 
existing activities such as extraction to be more socially and environmentally aware. This is 
achieved through the application of distributional, procedural, recognition and restorative 
principles. Energy companies and governments must work together to enforce these 
principles throughout energy systems. The extractive industries are often overlooked or 
underemphasized, in contrast to production oriented activities which often take place in more 
developed countries.18 The SLO is the framework for delivering a more systematic 
compliance with these principles. 
 
The crux of this paper is the investigatation of the ways in which SLO can be used as a legal 
framework for the application of energy justice and long-term sustainability. The distributive 
dimension asks energy companies to consider the inequalities associated with the 
development of their extractive activities. While, legal scholarship has reinforced the need for 
explicit reflection on procedural dimensions when extractive industries approach 
communities who are hosting their operations.19 Whilst there is evidence of improvements in 
this area, the case study on Columbia shows how companies could further improve their work 
in this area.  
 
Recognition justice challenges companies to consider the broader framework of human 
rights. This goes beyond simply ensuring that the correct processes of engagement with the 
community is enacted. The application of human rights is considered in detail with regards to 
the case study on Columbia below. And lastly, the extractive industries are increasingly 
cognizant of the need to actively involve themselves in restorative processes. Focus in the 
literature tends to be on the environment.20 The SLO reminds us that restoration is equally 
needed for the affected societies. These dimensions are assessed in relation to the case study 
on Columbia, starting with a more detailed consideration of the current understanding of SLO 
in existing literature. 
                                                          
14 Sara Bice and Kieren Moffat, "Social Licence to Operate and Impact Assessment," Impact Assessment & 
Project Appraisal 32, no. 4 (2014). 
15 IEA, "World Energy Statistics 2016," (Paris2016). 
16 IRENA, "Remap: A Roadmap for a Renewable Energy Future," (Abu Dhabi2016). 
17 Raphael. J. Heffron and Darren McCauley, "Achieving Sustainable Supply Chains through Energy Justice," 
Applied Energy 123 (2014) 
18 BK Sovacool, "Countering a Corrupt Oil Boom: Energy Justice, Natural Resource Funds, and Sao Tome E 
Principe's Oil Revenue Management Law," Environmental Science & Policy 55 (2016). 
19 Raphael Heffron and Gavin Little, eds., Delivering Energy Law and Policy in the EU and US (Edinburgh: 
Edinburgh University Press, 2016). 
20 M. Hamilton, "Restorative Justice Activity Orders: Furthering Restorative Justice Intervention in an 
Environmental and Planning Law Context?," Environmental and Planning Law Journal 32, no. 6 (2015). 
 
 
2: What is the SLO? 
 
2.1: SLO in the Literature 
 
SLO describes the relationship between corporations and the communities and societies in 
which they operate.21  The literature distinguishes SLO as a societal licence from that of a 
legal licence granted under the law. As a societal licence, the SLO is viewed as being 
external to the legal permits and licences to conduct energy operations, in which the right to 
conduct operations are not granted by the state but rather are approved by the local 
community.22  According to this view, SLO is not a legal construct.  Instead, SLO is an 
unwritten obligation by an energy company to communities and society that exists without 
written legal authority.23 This reflects the literature on SLO to-date. It is only recently that 
legal scholars have turned their attention to this concept as there has been the realisation that 
it contributes to increased energy justice and also since it is taking the form of a legal 
contract. 
 
The SLO could trace its roots philosophically from Rousseau and Locke who both wrote on 
the ‘social licence’, i.e. the concept of the social contract is where society supports ruling 
government activities when societal needs are met.24 In theory in the past scholars have 
viewed the social contract as sitting alongside the legal agreement/licence for exploration and 
exploitation activities. However, the SLO concept and its practice has suffered from not 
being well-defined. 
 
One scholar has attributed the term ‘SLO’ to Jim Cooney, a Canadian mining company 
executive, who first used it in 1997.25  Although the initial use of the phrase was 
metaphorical, it was subsequently adopted by the mining industry.26  And now while it has 
been in use over the past 20 years, a standardised definition of SLO has yet to emerge.27  An 
example of some definitions of SLO include:  
 “the demands on and expectations for a business enterprise that emerge from 
neighborhoods, environmental groups, community members, and other elements of 
the surrounding civil society”28,  
 “a community’s acceptance or approval of a project or the project operator’s ongoing 
presence in the community”29;  
 “exist[ing] when a mining project is seen as having the broad, ongoing approval and 
acceptance of society to conduct its activities”30. 
                                                          
21 Parsons, Lacey & Moffat. 2014, 83 
22 Ibid, Wilson, 2016, 73 
23 Ibid, Wilson, 2016, 73; Ibid, Parsons, Lacey & Moffat. 2014, 83 
24 This idea is noted in Ibid, Wilson, 2016, 73– who cites: John Morrison, The Social License : How to Keep 
Your Organization Legitimate (2014, Palgrave Macmillan UK).  
25 See Chilenye Nwapi, ‘Can the Concept of Social Licence to Operate Find its Way into the Formal Legal 
System?’ (2016) 18 Flinders Law Journal 349, 350; Ibid, Prno, 2013, 577.  
26 Robert G Boutilier, ‘Frequently asked questions about the social licence to operate’ (2014) 32(4) Impact 
Assessment and Project Appraisal 263, 263. 
27Ibid, Nwapi, 2016, 349, 355 
28 Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social Licence and Environmental Protection: 
Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29(2) Law and Social Inquiry 307, 308. 
29Ibid, Nwapi, 2016, 349, 355 
30 Ibid, Prno, 2013, 577 
 
One can see that these three definitions all have a particular bias, with a focus in essence on a 
particular community. This article upon its review of the literature, the development of the 
energy sector and the provision of a case study will present a definition of the SLO. 
 
2.2: SLO and its Relationship with Similar Constructs 
 
A reason for the lack of an agreed conceptual definition of the SLO is because of its 
association with similar concepts related to the energy sector. SLO is commonly associated 
with notions such as corporate social responsibility (CSR),31 social impact assessment,32 
legitimacy,33 stakeholder engagement,34 social contract theory35 and sustainability (or 
sustainable development) 36 and energy justice (more recently so).37 It is from this point that it 
can be determined that perhaps its meaning for the energy sector is not clear because scholars 
in the energy sector have not taken ownership over the term and how it applies in the energy 
sector and its importance. 
 
In terms of the latter associations, the SLO could be viewed as the outcome of these concepts 
and activities which could explain SLO’s close link with these terms. However, this is to 
ignore the ‘activity’ of the SLO itself and its impact. For example, one perspective states that 
the SLO is the result of a company undertaking CSR, i.e. that is, where a company engages in 
CSR, the community may grant the SLO.38  The close association of these concepts are also 
observed in the New Zealand Sustainable Business Council’s observation of actions that 
support the SLO: “Having an easily communicable sustainability strategy and transparent, 
credible reporting can assist businesses to build trust, improve brand and reputation, realise 
opportunities and lower risk [to gain or maintain SLO]”.39 
 
However, it is through the concept of energy justice that the importance of the SLO concept 
to the energy sector is emerging.40 As stated earlier, the practice of the SLO has a close 
association with the core tenets of energy justice, i.e. procedural, distribution and recognition 
justice. The energy justice framework places the SLO in the development of energy 
infrastructure chain as per below in Figure X. New energy infrastructure can be built across 
the energy life-cycle (i.e. from extraction, to production, top operation, to supply and to waste 
management – from cradle to grave) and for each activity a SLO will be needed. As the case 
study of Colombia will show, even the poorest communities will no longer accept the 
                                                          
31 Ibid, Wilson, 2016, 73; Jason Prno & D Scott Slocombe, ‘A Systems-Based Conceptual Framework for 
Assessing the Determinants of a Social License to Operate in the Mining Industry’(2014) 53 Environmental 
Management 672; Ibid, Parsons, Lacey, Moffat, 2014, 83 
32 Airong Zhang and Kieren Moffat, ‘A balancing act: The role of benefits, impacts and confidence in 
governance in predicting acceptance of mining in Australia’ (2015) 44 Resources Policy 25; Ibid, Demuijnck 
and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
33 Ibid, Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
34 Ibid, Parsons, Lacey, Moffat, 2014, 83; Ibid, Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
35 Ibid, Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
36 John R Owen and Deanna Kemp, ‘Social licence and mining: A critical perspective’ (2013) 38 Resources 
Policy 29. 
37 Ibid, Heffron and McCauley, 2017. 
38 Robert Boutilier, ‘Untangling CSR and Similar Concepts’ (n.d.) Australian Centre for Corporate Social 
Responsibility (ACCSR) <http://accsr.com.au/untangling-csr-and-similar-concepts/> accessed 10 June 2017. 
39 New Zealand Sustainable Business Council, Social Licence to Operate Paper (2013) 2 
<https://www.sbc.org.nz/__data/assets/pdf_file/0005/99437/Social-Licence-to-Operate-Paper.pdf>. 
40 As highlighted by Heffron and McCauley, 2017. 
behaviour of the past from energy companies, they want energy justice and they want it 
supported by the law (a legal “social contract” i.e. a written SLO). 
 




In essence the main reason to develop the legal nature of the SLO is to ensure it can be 
enforced. Too often energy companies (particularly, Multinational Companies (MNCs)) have 
not delivered in the past and there are numerous examples. The SLO needs to be binding, and 
the energy companies need to be accountable and also stakeholders need to be able to hold 
energy companies accountable. However, the incorporation of SLO into the legal regime is 
challenging.   
 
The lack of standard definition and the fact SLO is not yet a legal construct brings to question 
issues of regulation and enforcement of an abstract notion. The legal foundation and legal 
treatment of factors that contribute to SLO are explored in this section. It has been 
highlighted already in academic literature that the ‘SLO’ has not been explored extensively in 
research.41  It has been suggested that SLO’s similarity to other concepts, such as social 
contract theory (and those listed in earlier in Section 2), contributes to this lack of research on 
the concept.  In essence, to some degree, the SLO concept as has been researched, but under 
the auspices of other concepts.42   
 
Significantly it has been held that mere compliance with the legal licence and supporting laws 
– such as abiding by environmental laws or conducting environmental or social impact 
assessments – can be insufficient to establish a SLO.43  That is, a legal licence is not enough 
to guarantee the conduct of operations – a social licence, granted by the community, is now 
also required. The extra-judicial nature of SLO has led to criticism of the concept, with the 
assertion that it actually conflicts with the rule of law.44 In essence, does an SLO ask too 
much of an energy company? A Canadian think tank, has argued that SLO could be 
inconsistent with the notion of legal order: 
 
“Thinking of social licence to operate as a new quasi-legal requirement on companies, 
though, carries with it some extremely dangerous underlying assumptions. These 
become apparent as soon as one thinks again of what it measures: the risks of legal 
changes adverse to a business’s operations and of extra-legal disruptions of business 
activities.  To say that businesses operating in Canada should be subjected to a 
shifting social licence to operate is to say that businesses should face risks of legal 
changes that damage their business interests and of extra-legal disruption of their 
business activities by those opposed to them. To put it bluntly, any overly enthusiastic 
embrace of social licence to operate in its mistakenly transformed senses is actually a 
rejection of the rule of law and a suggestion that Canada should become a less well-
ordered society.” 45 
 
                                                          
41 Ibid, Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
42 Ibid, Demuijnck and Fasterling, 2016, 675 
43 Ibid, Prno and Slocombe, 2014, 672 
44 Ibid, Nwapi. 2016, 349 
45 Dwight Newman, Macdonald-Laurier Institute, ‘Commentary: Be Careful What You Wish For: Why Some 
Versions of “Social Licence” are Unlicensed and May be Anti-Social’ (November 2014) 3. 
A similar view was expressed by the Business Council of British Columbia: 
 
“If an aggressive social campaign questions the legitimacy of a formal review 
process, then we have remedies, political and legal, to improve the review process.  
We should not discard the formal process on the belief that direct civil action by 
public interest groups somehow represents a more democratically sound approach.”46 
 
However, the view that SLO is entirely separate to the law is not correct, it may have 
originated that way but it is fast becoming necessary and the views expressed above clearly 
have a corporate bias.   Hence, although the SLO may be external to the legal licence for 
energy projects, the law, in fact, may give effect to the SLO particularly when one considers 
the increasing success and application of energy justice, and some related issues are explored 
below. 
   
3.2: Legal Regulation of SLO Factors  
 
The social science literature has identified a number of factors that enable an SLO.47  While 
standardised criteria are lacking, inferences can be made of minimum standards that support 
establishment and maintenance of an SLO.48  Here, several of these minimum standards that 
can be observed in legal governance of natural resource exploration and exploitation, and 
which support and maintain the SLO are explored: 
 
 Procedural Justice;   
 Mitigation of environmental and social harms/ Impact Assessments; 
 Recognition Justice; and 
 Enforcement/Perceived effectiveness of regulation and governance of resource 
activities. 
 
3.2.1: Procedural Justice  
 
Procedural justice is a common principle in the legal governance of energy development.   
Procedural fairness in the process of community engagement in decision-making touches 
upon the democratic ideal of procedural due process (notice and the right to be heard).49  
From a US jurisprudence perspective in the context of the natural resources industry, 
procedural due process protects citizens from government acting arbitrarily, in secrecy, or 
without the participation of affected citizens.50 The idea of due process and public 
participation is also prominent in environmental law, which is essential to energy projects. 
                                                          
46 Business Council of British Columbia, ‘Rethinking Social Licence to Operate – A Concept in Search of 
Definition and Boundaries’ (May 2015) 7(2) Environment and Energy Bulletin 1, 3. 
47 David Jijelava & Frank Vanclay, ‘Legitimacy, credibility and trust as the key components of a social licence 
to operate: An analysis of BP's projects in Georgia’ (2017) 140 Journal of Cleaner Production 1077, 1078; 
Kieren Moffat and Airong Zhang, ‘The paths to social licence to operate: An integrative model explaining 
community acceptance of mining’ (2014) 39 Resources Policy 61; Ibid, Zhang and Moffat, 2015, 25; Justine 
Lacey et al., ‘The art and science of community relations: Procedural fairness at Newmont's Waihi Gold 
operations, New Zealand’ (2017) 52 Resources Policy 245. 
48 Ibid, Jijelava and Vanclay, 2017, 1077, 1078 
49 Barry Barton, ‘Underlying Concepts and Theoretical Issues in Public Participation in Resources 
Development’ chapter 2 in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George (Rock) Pring, Human Rights in 
Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP).  
50 Robin Kundis Craig, ‘Due Process Challenges in Environmental and Natural Resources Law’ (2013) FSU 
College of Law, Public Law Research Paper, No. 453, 3. 
Such due process was first proposed in 1987 in Our Common Future - Summary of Proposed 
Legal Principles for Environmental Protection and Sustainable Development Adopted by the 
WCED Experts Group on Environmental Law (viewed as the document that set the 
foundation for the Rio Convention – Declaration on Environment and Development) 
(hereinafter referred to as Our Common Future).51  Due process is among the suggested 
environmental principles:  “States shall inform in a timely manner all persons likely to be 
significantly affected by a planned activity and to grant them equal access and due process in 
administrative and judicial proceedings” (emphasis added).52   
 
Community engagement is part of that ‘due process’, i.e. procedural justice. It has even been 
advanced that the requirement for community engagement in project decision making “may 
have attained the status of customary international law”53 due to its prominence.  For 
instance, access to justice – the right to challenge decisions and seek and obtain redress for 
harm – is provided in a number of international legal instruments that require access to 
remedies in the event of environmental harm.54  One such example is the Convention on 
Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (Aahrus Convention).  This treaty has been incorporated into EU and 
Member State law through Directive 2003/4EC and Regulation EC 1367/2006, which set out 
means to enable procedural and substantive justice in environmental decision making.55 
Further the Aahrus Convention has been signed and ratified by 39 countries to-date.56 
 
The Aarhus Convention has three key pillars that support procedural justice directly and 
indirectly facilitate the development of SLO:  (1) information access; (2) public participation 
in decision-making processes; and (3) access to justice in environmental matters.57 Access to 
information can empower the public to participate in decision making process and voice 
concerns about legal licences and community impacts,58  i.e. the legal licence requirements 
influence SLO outcomes.59   
 
The concept of public engagement in major energy projects can also be found in the 
permitting processes for energy projects of common interest (PCIs) under the EU’s Trans-
                                                          
51Ibid, Barton, 2002; see also United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development, Our 
Common Future (1987) <www.un-documents.net/our-common-future.pdf.>  
52 United Nations, World Commission on Environment and Development, Our Common Future (1987) article 6. 
53 Ibid, Nwapi. 2016, 349, 365 
54 George (Rock) Pring and Susan Y. Noé, ‘The Emerging International Law of Public Participation Affecting 
Global Mining, Energy, and Resources Development’ 11 in Donald N Zillman, Alastair R Lucas and George 
(Rock) Pring, Human Rights in Natural Resource Development (2002 OUP).  
5555 European Commission, ‘The Aarhus Convention: The EU & the Aarhus Convention: in the EU Member 
States, in the Community Institutions and Bodies’ (last updated 12 May 2017) 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/aarhus/legislation.htm; see also European Commission, Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (2017) <http://ec.europa.eu/environment/pubs/pdf/factsheets/accesstojustice/en.pdf>. 
56United Nations Treaty Collection, 'Convention On Access To Information, Public Participation In Decision-
Making And Access To Justice In Environmental Matters' 
<https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=IND&mtdsg_no=XXVII-13&chapter=27&clang=_en#1 > 
accessed 9 October 2017. 
57Ibid, European Commission,‘The Aarhus Convention: The EU & the Aarhus Convention: in the EU Member 
States, in the Community Institutions and Bodies’ 
58 Neil Gunningham, Robert A Kagan and Dorothy Thornton, ‘Social Licence and Environmental Protection: 
Why Businesses go Beyond Compliance’ (2004) 29(2) Law and Social Inquiry 307, 329. 
59. Ibid, Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton, 2004, 307, 329 
European Energy Infrastructure Regulation (TEN-E Regulation).60 This regulation provides a 
framework for development of energy infrastructure interconnectivity in Europe, such as 
electricity interconnectors and transboundary natural gas pipeline networks.  Annex VI of the 
TEN-E Regulation establishes Guidelines for Transparency and Public Participation.  As 
explained by the European Commission, the TEN-E Regulation, “recognises that 
transparency and early and effective involvement of the public is essential for complex 
infrastructure projects to be approved quickly and effectively”.61  A current example of the 
public engagement process under the TEN-E Regulation can be observed for carbon dioxide 
(CO2) transport projects, in which the European Commission commenced a public 
consultation on 24 May 2017.62 
 
A further issue in relation to procedural justice concerns land access. This issue concerns the 
terms upon which the energy/resource company enters the land of the private landholder to 
undertake licenced exploration/exploitation activities – this issue is explored in more detail in 
relation to a case study on Columbia in section five. The concept of fairness/due process is 
found in legislatively prescribed engagements between the natural resource company and 
community in land access legislation for energy projects, including the imposition of good 
faith negotiation standards.  For example, the Australian state of Queensland’s Land Access 
Code sets out as a general principle that both the landowner and resource company are to 
“liaise…in good faith” in the negotiation of land access terms.63  The requirement to 
negotiate in good faith is also found in Australia’s Native Title Act 1993 (Cth), which governs 
access to Indigenous land.64  For example, section 31 of the Native Title Act addresses the 
negotiation procedure and provides that the “negotiation parties must negotiate in good 
faith…”65  
 
3.2.2: Impact Assessments 
 
Procedural fairness and public participation in decision making are also included in the 
legislative processes for impact assessments (IAs) of major projects – both environmental 
(EIA) and social (SIA).  Through IAs, significant effects of projects are evaluated before 
government consent is issued so that strategies can be developed to minimise negative social 
and environmental impacts and maximise benefits.66 Two examples are considered below but 
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66 Ibid, Zhang and Moffatt, 2015, 25 
it should be remembered that EIAs are now in operation in over 100 countries worldwide67 





The European Union issued the EIA Directive in 2014, which requires Member States to 
“adopt all measures necessary to ensure that, before consent is given, projects likely to have 
significant effects on the environment by virtue, inter alia, of their nature, size or location are 
made subject to a requirement for development consent and an assessment with regard to 
their effects”.68  Major projects subject to the EIA Directive include certain energy and 
natural resources works.69  Legislative mandate for public engagement in the EIA process can 
be found at the Member State level, such as in the UK’s Town and Country Planning 
(Environmental Impact Assessment) Regulations 2017, UK legislation that governs EIAs, 
with application to natural resource developments.70  As explained by the UK government: 
“The aim of Environmental Impact Assessment is also to ensure that the public are given 
early and effective opportunities to participate in the decision making procedures”.71   
 
SIAs are now part of the EIA process, hence it is clear that a ‘social’ element or agreement is 
already legislated for. An example of this is in the legislation of the Australian state of 
Queensland.  SIAs must be undertaken when environmental impact statements are required, 
and this includes resource projects.72 Five social issues related to natural resource projects are 
covered by the Queensland SIA process: 1) engagement with community and stakeholders; 2) 
workforce management; housing and accommodation; 3) local content; 4) health; and 5) 
community wellbeing.73   
 
The SIA is the foundation for the required social impact management plan, which formalises 
the actions for managing negative social impacts and maximising community benefits and 
contributes to creation of SLO.74 As explained by the Queensland government, “In Australian 
jurisdictions, there is strong industry support for the role of a ‘social licence to operate’ as a 
complement to the regulatory licence issued by government”, 75 and was described as 
“represent[ing] world best practice”. 76     
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Not only is the process of engagement provided by IA legislation important, but also the 
robustness of IA governance is essential in establishing the SLO.  Research of the role of IAs 
in social acceptance of mining in Australia found that that public confidence in the 
governance of legislatively mandated IA processes (including compliance enforcement) was 
essential for the SLO of mining activities.77  Confidence in the IA legal regime established a 
belief that industry would be held accountable for negative social and environmental impacts 
of their projects, which facilitated public support of projects.   
 
Conversely, it has been asserted that the formalistic nature of the IA process is one that is 
inflexible and controlled by stakeholders external to the local community, which may hinder 
the establishment of the SLO.78 This inflexibility could mean that even though the 
community may object to the project, approval is granted because compliance with the 
assessment process is achieved.79 The formalistic nature may also reduce trust and 
engagement between the parties.80 Thus, while IAs may contribute to the SLO, the formal IA 
process set out in law may undermine the establishment of the SLO.  However, contrary 
views highlight the importance of concerns of the local communities being addressed through 
formal IA processes for example,: “Citizens expect that the legislative and regulatory 
processes that are in place to protect the environment reflect their interests and values 
alongside the need to develop mineral and energy endowments for economic interest” 
(emphasis added).81 The failure of legal processes to support these citizen expectations could 
therefore hinder the development of a SLO. 
 
3.2.3: Recognition Justice: Human Rights 
 
Recognition justice in this context is about the recognition of disaffected communities who 
own the property rights of land that will be affected by energy development. In many cases 
(but not always) there is a particular issue concerning indigenous communities who have a 
different relationship with the land owing to a way of life. Nevertheless, there are many 
human rights issues here and these also a factor in resource companies establishing and 
maintaining a SLO. Human rights, in the context of a SLO and energy projects, are addressed 
in the law. Two ways in which human rights are addressed in the energy sector are through 
the legal concept of Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC) and industry self-regulation efforts 
through the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights. 
 
Human rights as a foundation of SLO has been associated with the legal concept of FPIC.  
FPIC seeks to address Indigenous people’s concerns about project impacts on their land, by 
empowering Indigenous landholders with the right to consent (or not) to the project 
activities.82  Such consent must be given freely and prior to project commencement.   
 
In exercising this right, indigenous groups have been encouraged to formally document their 
consent, for example:, “Indigenous peoples should express their consent in a formal, written 
agreement with the company or other formal documentation; [a]fter an indigenous 
                                                          
77 Ibid, Zhang and Moffatt, 2015, 25 
78 Ibid, Nwapi, 2016, 349, 363 
79 Ibid, Nwapi, 2016, 349, 363 
80 Ibid, Bice and Moffat, 2014, 257; Justine Lacey, ‘Can you legislate a social licence to operate?’(26 February 
2016) The Conversation <http://theconversation.com/can-you-legislate-a-social-licence-to-operate-10948>. 
81 Ibid, Zhang and Moffatt, 2015, 25, 32 
82 Ibid, Nwapi, 2016, 349, 354 
community formally provides its consent, a company must continue to engage with the 
community in order to maintain that consent -- and, thus, the company’s social license to 
operate”.83   This notion is also found in Australia, in which agreements are delivered under 
the Native Title Act, including Indigenous Land Use Agreements.84  
 
FPIC can also be found in international documents, such as the International Labour 
Organisation’s Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989,85 and in the UN Declaration 
on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (2007).86 Further, FPIC is observed in self-regulatory 
efforts as well, such as in CSR efforts, in which companies voluntarily incorporate human 
rights in their CSR frameworks.87  FPIC has also been described as more clearly defined and 
easily understandable than SLO,88 and is “ensconced in international law”.89   
 
However, FPIC is also more narrow than SLO.  First, FPIC is described as an acute or 
distinct action (one-off), whereas SLO requires continued community support that spans the 
life of an energy project90 when in operation and the decommissioning phase. Second FPIC 
typically applies to engagements with indigenous peoples – being an indigenous right – 91 
rather than a right that applies to other groups as is the case with SLO.92  However, it should 
be noted that, FPIC has been extended beyond the context of rights of Indigenous people.93  
For example, the Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS) incorporated the FPIC 
principle in its 2009 Directive on the Harmonization of Guiding Principles and Policies in 
the Mining Sector. There FPIC is a state obligation (extended to private entities acting for the 
state), whereas SLO extends to private enterprises.94   
 
Finally, distinction is also made between the FPIC principle and legal consent. While energy 
projects are authorised under a legal licence or permit, societal endorsement or approval – 
that is, consent of the public – is also required for operations to occur.95  However, “[i]t has 
been observed that companies are averse to speak of consent because of the capacity of the 
term to give substantial power to their host communities; they are therefore unwilling to 
equate social licence with ‘community consent’.” 96 
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Another mechanism that addresses human rights in energy project activities is the Voluntary 
Principles on Security and Human Rights.97  The Voluntary Principles on Security and 
Human Rights are described as “the only human rights guidelines designed specifically for 
extractive sector companies”.98 The Voluntary Principles, established by a consortium of 
governments, corporations and nongovernmental organisations, promote human rights 
standards to be used by security forces in the natural resources sector.99 Companies then 
incorporate these principles into their operating standards, which provides a means of 
industry self-regulation (an idea which is explored later in this paper).   
 
3.2.4: Distributive Justice: Legal Agreements and SLO 
 
While the SLO is not established through a formal agreement between communities and 
project developers,100 contracts can be used to document the conditions for the resource 
company’s SLO, and thereby provide tangibility to the SLO construct.101  These agreements 
typically address key SLO themes such as human rights, environment and social concerns,102 
and address compensation and distribution of benefits.103  The execution of these contracts by 
communities is viewed as a measurement of community support for resource company 
activities, providing tangibility to the SLO concept.104 
 
The implementation of contracts for SLO in the natural resources sector has been described 
as an evolution in law.  It is one in which contract law has expanded beyond protection of 
investor rights to include consideration of communities impacted by natural resource 
operations105 as outlined below:  
 
“This contemporary contractual landscape shows that the law of contract in the 
extractive industries context cannot in the twenty-first century continue to be based on 
legal theories developed in the nineteenth century according to which ‘any private 
actor who is good enough to open his property to the public by putting it into the lines 
of commerce should not be discouraged by imposing even the most limited of social 
duties on his conduct’.106  
 
According to this view, social order and the rights of groups are inherent aspects of 
international human rights law, emphasising the rights of groups and the collective rather 
than rights of individual. 107  Another view is that community contracts have evolved as a 
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mechanism to overcome the challenge of defining and measuring compliance of SLO in the 
natural resources sector through legal regulation.108 
 
While CDAs provide a means of tangibility for the conditions giving rise to a SLO, mere 
contractual compliance alone is not in itself sufficient to deliver and maintain a SLO:  
 
“Issues may arise, for example, that fall outside an agreement that cause angst, anger 
and concern to parties to the agreement. It is the organisation’s response to these 
additional issues that also determine whether or not their apparent ‘social licence’ is 
maintained. Conversely, breaches of agreement conditions may not necessarily 
diminish the so-called ‘social licence’ if a company responds appropriately. For 
instance, if a company inadvertently damages cultural heritage but responds by way 
of immediate and respectful notification to elders, accepts fault and provides an 
apology, compensation or other acceptable measures in alignment with the terms 
codified in the agreement”.109   
 
4: SLOs in the Law  
 
4.1: Community Development Agreements 
 
SLO contracts, while typically called Community Development Agreements (CDAs),110 are 
known by many names.111  Table 1 presents commonly used names for CDAs.   
 
Table 1: Community Development Agreements Nomenclature 
 
 Benefits Sharing Agreements (Chile) 
 Community Contracts 
 Community Development Agreements 
 Community Development Initiatives 
 Community Joint Venture Agreements 
 Empowerment Agreements 
 Exploration Agreements 
 Investment Agreements (Mongolia) 
 Impact Benefit Agreements (Canada) 
 
 
 Indigenous Land Use Agreements (Australia) 
 Landowner Agreements 
 Participation Agreements 
 Partnership or Partnering Agreements  
 Protocol Agreements 
 Shared Responsibilities Agreements 
 Social Trust Funds (Peru) 
 Voluntary Agreements  
Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017). 112 
 
These agreements may be bilateral (between the investor and community) or tripartite 
(among the investor, state and community).113 Establishment of the community agreement 
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may be initiated voluntarily by the energy/resource company. 114 Despite the fact that CDAs 
are becoming more common,115 many CDAs are confidential and therefore are not readily 
accessible.  However, two examples of CDAs that may be reviewed online include: Argyle 
Diamond Mine Participation Agreement (Australia) and the Ahafo Social Responsibility 
Agreement (Ghana).116  While a standard model CDA is yet to be seen, some general 
practices can be found in the accessible examples that are applicable across jurisdictions and 
communities.117 
 
Several benefits are associated with the negotiated SLO contracts, such as: increased 
transparency in distribution of benefits and clarity of stakeholder roles and expectations, 
increased engagement and communication between the parties, empowering communities, 
improving CSR and sustainability outcomes.118  However, the agreement itself is not 
sufficient to maintain SLO—implementation and management of the contract also have 
important roles in continuance of the SLO.119   
 
While resource companies may be required by law to put CDAs in place, the regulation may 
not extend to the specific contents of the CDA.120 In addition (and as noted above), the 
agreement’s provisions may be confidential. This lack of transparency may give the resource 
company an advantage in negotiation of future CDAs opposite community counterparties.121 
CDAs set out rights and obligations of the parties, including dispute resolution procedures.  
Breach of the agreement would give rise to a claim by one of the contracting parties. 
Interestingly, the MMDA,122 proposes that material breach of a CDA should be linked to the 
mineral licence awarded by the government to the resource company.123 This would enable a 
tripartite engagement, resulting in government intervention in CDA disputes, and linking the 
SLO as embodied in the CDA to the government licence.124   
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4.2: CDAs in Primary Law 
 
Recognition of the importance of societal and community considerations in the development 
of major resource projects can be found in the law. In many cases, the requirements for CDAs 
are established in legislation, and can be found in jurisdictions such as Canada and Australia 
(regarding indigenous peoples) and a number of African nations (such as Nigeria, Kenya and 
Mozambique).125   
 
The International Bar Association initiated the Model Mining Development Agreement 
(MMDA) project in 2009 to establish a standardised mining agreement.126 The MMDA is 
intended for use between mining companies and host governments, particularly of developing 
nations where mining laws are not well established or well implemented.127 As explained on 
the MMDA’s website, the mining contract extends beyond the requirements of the two 
contracting parties.   
 
“While the project clearly recognizes that a mining development must be 
commercially viable to proceed, it also recognizes this is no longer the only issue 
around which contract negotiations should proceed. Rather, all parties to a negotiation 
should take a broader, and integrated, look at the relationship between the proposed 
project, the state and the local communities. The natural, social and economic 
environments around mining projects are also essential considerations today… it 
seeks to provide an agenda for negotiations based on a sustainable development 
objective that is common to all parties. Its public nature will also allow local 
communities and civil society groups to contribute in a sound manner to negotiation 
processes. By setting out a comprehensive and common template, it is hoped the 
project will enable and assist better structured negotiations, and better lasting results 
in mining projects”. 128 
 
The model agreement contains provisions that address CDAs.  Under the MMDA, the 
proposed scope of CDAs includes: distribution of benefits from project, mitigation of adverse 
impacts, how local development spend will be made, addressing environmental, social, and 
economic conditions both during and after project operations.129   
 
4.3: Agreements between Local Governments and Mining Companies 
 
A recent development has occurred in the U.S. state of Colorado that could be viewed as a 
type of CDA—Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). Unconventional gas exploration and 
drilling is regulated at the state level in Colorado. However, such industry activity is not 
universally supported at the state level130. The Colorado Supreme Court has confirmed that 
state law pre-empts local regulation of unconventional gas.131 However, in an effort to have 
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some control over local level activities, local governments have entered into MOUs with 
unconventional gas companies. The MOU make operations subject to local regulations 
through a contractual mechanism when the local governments do not have jurisdiction to 
legislate. Companies that enter into MOUs benefit from streamlined permitting132.  
 
These MOUs set out best management practices for unconventional gas development. One 
example is found in the MOU between the Town of Erie, Colorado and Anadarko Petroleum 
Corporation, dated 28 August 2012, which establishes six best management practices are set 
out for unconventional gas development within the city limits.133 The best practices address: 
setback of operations from buildings, prior notice of activity to landowners within ½ mile of 
location of operations; mobilisation and demobilisation plans; traffic management, mitigation 
of noise, light and dust; reclamation plan; and certain technical requirements for drilling and 
operations.134 The communities and the oil and gas companies view the MOUs as a means to 
address community concerns and improve relationships between the parties.135  That is, they 
are a means of establishing an SLO.  
 
Research on the effect of the MOU process revealed that the MOU improved the 
community’s trust of the local government, and not of the oil and gas company.  This is 
because ‘procedural justice’ was enhanced, with the MOU improving transparency and public 
engagement, as the local governance board “explicitly welcomed even critical public 
comments, made themselves available to citizens for conversations, and provided more 
information on the town website”.136 Interestingly, while these terms are established in the 
MOUs, tension still remains between the local communities and government and state 
governments.  For example, it has been reported the state regulator has refused to include 
MOU best practices in the Colorado state permits.  This has caused local governments and 
communities to question why the state would exclude points that are important to the local 
population.137 This highlights the tension between local regulation/community expectations 
and the authority of the distantly removed state regulator. 
 
Finally, MOUs have been used in Colombia, as well.  Both as public-private partnerships to 
address extreme poverty138 and as agreements between nations (Colombia as a coal producer 
and the Netherlands as the coal consumer).139 
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(6 May 2015) <https://www.minminas.gov.co/web/ingles/noticias?idNoticia=1191021>.  
4.4: Contract Duration Challenges 
 
The lengthy lifespan of energy projects can present long term challenges for the SLO.  
Unanticipated issues may arise through the course of the contract and community values and 
priorities may change, which could lead to reduced support for the energy company’s 
operations. A key example of an intergenerational challenge can be seen in the operations of 
a copper mine in Papua New Guinea, where the SLO was lost across the generations.140  
Although an agreement was established in 1967, subsequent generations in the local 
community were not supportive of the contract’s terms, viewing the distribution of funds 
under the contract to be inequitable as they favoured primary, but not secondary, landowners 
and this resulted in the mine been attacked in protest in 1988 and forcing its closure.141  This 
illustrates the risks associated with formalised agreements, rigidity can “constrain thinking,” 
which ultimately limits “the capacity of the parties to adapt to changing circumstances”.142  
 
The issue of intergenerational SLO has been described as being best managed by ensuring 
continued support and consent throughout the contract’s life, rather than assuming consent is 
a one-time event at the signing of the contract.143 Therefore, CDAs should be accompanied 
by a monitoring program, which includes ongoing engagement with local communities and 
stakeholders to “promptly” identify and address any changes or concerns.144 Or CDAs should 
have expiry dates, which would necessitate renegotiation, thus enabling problems and 
modern community concerns to be addressed.145   
 
4.5: SLO – Industry and Institutional Activities (Soft Law) 
 
Voluntary efforts of industry and institutions, are another means of supporting SLO.  These 
actions reveal another source of SLO governance through self-regulation– codes and 
standards that are not legally binding.  These ‘civil regulations’ have been described as 
industry self-regulation,146 which mitigates the need for government intervention and legally 
enforced regulation.147   
 
When government regulates or legislates company activity, a company’s non-compliance or 
breach of law could cause adverse publicity.  Non-compliance could lead to public rejection 
or rescission of the company’s SLO.148 Thus, the advantage of a self-regulated means of 
establishing a SLO is avoidance of regulatory compliance, enforcement and audits.149 
However, industry self-regulation has been criticised for failing to establish uniformity in 
regulatory standards and for lacking mechanisms for enforcement.  This means not all 
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companies will adopt the suggested standards, or they may be selective in the standards they 
adopt.150   
 
Self-regulation of energy industry activities that facilitate SLO, both through international 
collaboration and industry efforts, are briefly explored below in Tables 2 and 3; it should be 




Table 2. Sample of International Initiatives  
Entity/Instrument SLO Aspect Brief Description 
Voluntary Principles  Human Rights Governments, Companies and NGOs that have 
established international standards for safety and 
security in extractive industry operations. 
Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative 
Transparency Global best practices standard for governance and 
transparency of the oil, gas and mineral resources 
sectors. 
U.N. Global Compact Human Rights Ten principles for sustainable corporate practices.  
Addresses human rights, labour, environment and 
anti-corruption. 
International Finance Corporation 
(World Bank) - Stakeholder 
Engagement: A Good Practice 
Handbook for Companies Doing 
Business in Emerging Markets 
Stakeholder 
Engagement 
Best practices for stakeholder engagement. 
Source:  Constructed by the Authors (2017). 151 
 
Table 3 Sample of Industry and Sector Initiatives  
Sector Role Description 
Shale Gas 
Center for Responsible Shale 
Development (CRSD) 
Standard Setting and Certification Certify companies against 
established standards. 
Equitable Origin (EO)152 Benchmark and measure Assist companies in 
benchmarking performance 
against EO’s proprietary standards 
for energy projects. 
Not shale gas specific. 
Mining 
International Council on Mining 
and Metals – 10 Principles  
Mining Industry Body in Australia Sustainable development 
principles that companies must 
agree to adopt as condition of 
MCA membership. 
Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017).153 
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152 Equitable Origin, < www.equitableorigin.org/> accessed 16 June 2017. 
 
4.6: SLO and Self-Regulation – International Efforts 
 
Public-private partnerships (PPPs) are one means of self-regulation for CSR, which could 
lead to realisation of the SLO. Through PPPs, private and public sector entities collaborate to 
address social risks associated with energy/mining operations.154 Some international PPP 
examples include: the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights, and the 
Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI).   
 
The Voluntary Principles on Security and Human was mentioned previously in the context of 
human rights and SLO, which addresses security and safety in the conduct of operations in 
the extractive industry.   
 
The EITI, sets a global best practices standard for governance and transparency of the oil, gas 
and mineral resources sectors155; as noted previously, transparency is one key factor that 
facilitates the SLO.. The U.S. State Department in relation to the EITI has stated that (in 
2014, the U.S. became the first G8 country to join the EITI): “… [The EITI] is a voluntary 
initiative through which countries commit to publish reports on how the government manages 
the oil, gas, and mining sectors. These reports include a reconciliation of revenues paid by 
extractive companies and revenues received by governments. The process is managed in each 
country by a multi-stakeholder group of government, civil society, and company 
representatives”.156 Therefore it is clear that there is an international initiative being taken 
towards the promotion of transparency and accountability in the resource extraction industry 
to allow countries, particularly developing countries to benefit from the exploitation of their 
resources.157 
 
4.7: SLO and Self-Regulation – Industry Efforts 
 
Self-regulatory initiatives have also been undertaken by industry bodies, which seek to 
influence the SLO for the extractive industry. Consider, for example, the Australian mining 
industry’s trade organisation – the Minerals Council of Australia (MCA) – position on SLO:  
  
“The Australian minerals industry strongly supports the role of a ‘social licence to 
operate’ as a complement to a regulatory licence issued by government.  To the 
minerals industry ‘social licence to operate’ is about operating in a manner that is 
attuned to community expectations and which acknowledges that businesses have a 
shared responsibility with government, and more broadly society, to help facilitate the 
development of strong and sustainable communities”.158 
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The MCA, as a means of industry self-regulation, has established sustainable development 
principles to which the Council’s members must abide for MCA membership.159 Based on the 
International Council on Mining and Metals’ 10 Principles,160 these principles of sustainable 
development can be observed to address factors associated with establishing and maintaining 
SLO, such as:  
 as upholding human rights (Principle 3); 
 continual improvement in environmental performance (Principle 6); and  
 social impact management in local communities (Principle 9).161   
 
The International Council on Mining and Metals’ 10 Principles have been benchmarked 
against several international standards: These include: the Rio Declaration, the Global 
Reporting Initiative, the Global Compact, OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, 
World Bank Operational Guidelines, OECD Convention on Combating Bribery, ILO 
Conventions 98, 169, 176, and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.162 
 
Several self-regulation efforts can also be observed in the U.S. shale gas industry, in which 
industry organisations establish best practices for shale gas operations.163 However, these are 
not without their critics.  One example of self-regulation in the U.S.’s shale gas sector can be 
observed in the Center for Responsible Shale Development (CRSD) (formerly known as the 
Centre for Sustainable Shale Development)- See Case Study in Box 1.164 The CRSD 
establishes industry standards performance standards and certifies company compliance with 
these standards.165 From this case study it is clear that self-regulation efforts have the 
potential to bring different stakeholders together and although the current aim of the Trump 
administration is to scale back on federal environmental regulations, we can see that 
companies continue to “feel the need to earn the social license to operate.”166 
 
Box 1. Center for Responsible Shale Development – Case Study 
 
The Centre for Responsible Shale Development (CSRD) is a non-profit organisation based in 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.  It has established 15 technical performance standards for environmental 
protection in shale gas development and certifies organisations as meeting those standards.  The 
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commitments/icmm-10-principles> accessed 10 June 2017.  
163 Don C Smith and Jessica M Richards, ‘Social Licence to Operate: Hydraulic Fracturing-Related Challenges 
Facing the Oil &Gas Industry’ (January 2015) 1(2) Oil and Gas, Natural Resources, and Energy Journal 81, 105 
- 111. 
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CSRD describes itself as “an alliance of energy producers and environmental organizations 
working together to demonstrate responsible stewardship of the environment and its resources”.167    
 
Shale gas operators may apply for CSRD certification, certifying they meet the 15 performance 
standards.  Certified companies agree to be subjected to well site visits and ongoing reviews during 
the two-year certification period.  Reports on reviews and evaluations are available online, as a 
means of promoting transparency.  Shell and Chevron are among companies that have been 
received certification.   
 
CRSD evolved from the Shale Gas Roundtable group established in 2011.  The group established 
the Institute for Gas Drilling Excellence in 2012 to determine best practices for shale gas 
development in the region.  In 2013, the Institute adopted the name Center for Sustainable Shale 
Development (CSSD).  The organisation was renamed the Center for Responsible Shale 
Development in 2016 in order to “better reflect its mission and enhanced stakeholder engagement”. 
168 
 
The CRSD is not without controversy.  It has been accused of being a greenwashing activity, and 
criticised for having too close ties to the shale gas industry.169. And the organisation’s previous 
name was subject to critique – with the use of the word ‘Sustainable’ being questioned for 
appropriateness.170  Conversely, the CRSD has been lauded in the media as a promising self-
regulatory effort that could “hasten the expansion of fracking by making drilling more acceptable to 
states and communities that feared the environmental consequences”.171 
 
 
4.8: Government Intervention when Self-Regulation is Insufficient  
 
Complete reliance on self-regulation with regards to the effective implementation of the SLO 
can be questioned, Governments may decide to intervene and aim to improve industry self-
regulation efforts and to strengthen accountability. One example is observed in mandatory 
disclosure rules for the extractive industries, which are currently addressed in the EITI.  Both 
the U.S. (Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (2010) and 
subsequent SEC rule which was judicially vacated))172 and EU (Accounting Directive)173, 
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have sought to expand certain disclosures under EITI practice.174 It should be noted that the 
Dodd-Frank transparency rule was repealed in 2017.175   
 
Another example of government efforts to regulate self-regulation can be observed in an 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) harmonisation initiative.  The 
ECOWAS harmonisation effort is intended to“[s]trengthen and consolidate the project to 
harmonize policies and mining codes in a context where the sub-region has the same mining 
resources and faces the same multinationals”.176  EITI actions are among the standards 
included in the ECOWAS review. 
 
Regulatory intervention by government may not always be a feasible option to address 
industry’s ineffective self-regulation. First, government must have the capability/expertise 
and appetite to enforce infringements, which it may not have, particularly in developing 
world nations where resources are a challenge.177 Second, foreign investment liberalisation 
means many in-country resource companies are multinationals, and may be subject to 
minimal state control.178 Corporate operations are often decentralised, with headquarters and 
stock exchange listings in countries different to that of the energy project operations, which 
has the effect of minimising accountability at the local level.  The independence of 
multinationals may make regulatory enforcement (including sanctions) difficult, with the 
multinational entity having domestic domicile merely ‘on paper’.179  Furthermore, one could 
criticise the SLO process itself and its usual application. For example, is too much focus 
placed on economic gains for local communities in lieu of strong protection of the natural 
environment?180The incompatible nature of economic development via resource extraction 
with environmental preservation provides a significant challenge to governments seeking to 
intervene as it could lead to disagreement, as seen between “market-centric and eco-centric 
perspectives.”181 
 
What is the answer when self-regulation and government regulation are ineffective?  Hybrid 
soft law regulatory models may provide solutions, such as those that involve the participation 
of industry and government, such as PPPs.182 
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5: Colombia: The SLO in the Mining-Energy sector. 
 
The Mining-Energy sector has been one of the main drivers of the Colombian economy 
during the last thirteen years183, particularly when the commodities prices were higher (2011-
2014)184. Although the Colombian Government has adjusted its macroeconomic strategy to 
incentivise other sectors of the economy to be less dependent on the hydrocarbons prices185, 
they have still strongly supported the Mining-Energy sector, particularly the offshore 
industry186 due to the limited oil reserves (roughly five years more)187.         
 
Nevertheless, it seems that the Mining-Energy sector does not have the acceptance of some 
part of the society and some local authorities (governments). From 2013188, there have been a 
great number of consultation processes where local communities have rejected the 
exploitation of mines and hydrocarbons in their territories.189 This issue has been further 
emphasised in highly unforeseen outcome where in Cajamarca’s, the local community voted 
against perhaps one of the potentially largest gold mine in South America190 in a striking 
outcome: 97,92 percent voted ‘no’ to the development in the polls191. This number is 
surprising given the pre-existing investment of USD $19 million of Anglo Gold Ashanti’s 
Corporate Social Responsibility expenditure in Cajamarca192 and the USD $900 million 
invested by the same Company since 2006 in Colombia193. After this precedent, 44 
municipalities from 1101194 have intentions to follow the same similar strategy, and ban 
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petroleum and mining projects in their territories through popular consultations; there are 15 
initiatives to prohibit petroleum projects and 26 more to forbid mining activities.195 
 
However, a number of questions arise, why are these municipalities (i.e. local governments) 
appealing to a popular consultation to reject extractive industries in their territories? Are the 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or Sustainable Development Strategies (SDS) of the 
extractive companies not working? And why there is a constantly clash among the Central 
Government, Local Authorities and, also, the Judicial system regarding the extractive and 
petroleum regulation?  
 
The problem in Colombia is the lack of energy justice in the energy sector. The use of the 
land and the subsoil196; environmental care197; allocation of royalties198; local content199; 
mining informality200; sustainable development and extreme poverty201; and legal stability202 
are all part of the main reasons for the problems in the Mining-Energy sector in Colombia. 
Some communities in Colombia in essence want to see more the application of justice 
principles of distribution, procedural, and recognition in their energy sector and the 
application of restorative justice during the lifespan of an energy project. These communities 
are claiming that the national energy policies shall include their principal needs, interests and 
concerns. For instance, some experts203 argued that the feeling of local people is that the 
Government does not involve and include them from the beginning of the projects and, also, 
that there is a disconnection between the licensing process of a mining right and the planning 
of the use of the land. As a result, communities want their own agreement in place before 
energy development occurs. In essence what they advocate for as will be demonstrated in 
below in the section is a SLO with the company engaging in the activity. 
 
In this section, the development of a SLO system in the energy sector is explored. Its 
background is through the law and the Constitutional High Court positions as is identified 
below and a number of key stages in its development are outlined in the proceeding sections. 
 
5.1. Stage 1 - Legal structural division between the land and the sub-soil   
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Contrary to the United States, in Colombia, oil and gas does not belong to the owner of the 
land or to the person that is capable to capture the hydrocarbons.204 The ownership of 
petroleum lies with the State. However, the State, in this context, is an abstract concept 
because it does not specify the public entity that is entitled to claim dominion over the non-
renewable natural resources.205 This lack of clarity is still more problematic in a polarised 
country where there is a constant tension between the Local Governments (Territorial 
Entities) and the Central Government over the benefits (royalties) gained by the exploitation 
of natural resources even though both public entities are obliged to cooperate to fulfil their 
goals. This tension is better illustrated due to the negotiation power that each entity has over 
the other. Hence, this first stage will briefly address how the political division in Colombia 
can affect the ownership of hydrocarbons in Colombia.           
 
Territorial Entities are completely independent to manage and govern their territories. 
Colombia is a social state organised as a “unitary decentralized republic with policy 
centralization and administrative decentralization”206. Thus, the Territorial Entities 
(Departments, Regions, Municipalities and Indigenous territories) are completely 
autonomous of the political centralisation power of the executive branch at central level207. 
For instance, the definition of the use of the land is a competence exclusively delegated to 
Territorial Entities208. Even more, is because of such independence that the allocation of 
competences between both levels requires a specific procedural law (ley orgánica de 
ordenamiento territorial)209. 
 
The ownership of the non-renewable resources and the sub-soil belongs to the State210. 
However, what is the meaning of the State? Is it similar to the Nation? The State includes all 
the public entities whereas the Nation is associated exclusively with Central Authorities211. 
Bearing in mind these concepts, it is important to emphasise that the Constitution 
interestingly avoided granting the benefits of the natural resources exploitation either in 
favour of the Executive Branch at Central Level (Nation) or Territorial Entities212. 
Notwithstanding, the National Congress is entitled to regulate the exploitation of the natural 
resources and delegate by law the direction or intervention of the sub-soil in the Central 
Government213.  
 
As a result, it is clear that the constituent assembly of 1991 did not want to gather all the 
wealth of the natural resources exploitation neither in the Nation nor in the Local Authorities 
because the decentralised spirit of the Constitution. By contrary, the constituent assembly 
expressly made a structural separation between the governance of the land and the 
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governance of the sub-soil. The former (land) is delegated to Territorial Entities whereas the 
latter (sub-soil) is transferred to the Congress, which in turn, can delegate it to the Central 
Level. Nonetheless, constitutionally, both public entities (Local and Central) are obliged to 
cooperate in order to reach their objectives regardless of any disparity of functions214. In 
essence, one cannot operate without the other’s permission. 
 
However, is this structural division sustainable in practice when, for instance, extracting 
mineral resources can affect the ‘surface’?215 This is addressed in the next section. 
 
5.2. Stage 2 - An attempt to regulate the Territorial Entities competences through a 
Mining Code: it was necessary? 
 
Arguably, a key point of this controversy about the surface and the sub-soil regulation 
emerged with the Article 37 of the Mining Code introduced in 2001. This provision pointed 
out that no regional, sectional or local authority can exclude permanently or provisionally 
from their territories mining activities; in other words, Territorial Entities were not entitled to 
ban mining activities through the planning of the use of the land. This provision favoured 
energy development without considering the interests of Territorial Entities. Consequently, a 
great number of a constitutional citizen actions emerged against this provision.  
 
Since then, the Constitutional Court has explored the constitutionality of this provision on 
three occasions with different outcomes. In 2012, the provision was declared as valid in the 
context that it was in the public interest that there is mining activity. In 2014, however, there 
was a trend that marked the beginning of the development of the equivalent of a SLO: the 
provision would still remain valid but on the basis that a settlement shall be agreed between 
the National Government and the Local Authorities (administrative coordination principle) 
regarding the environmental activities and protection from the mining activity.216 
 
In 2016, the Constitutional Court, however, abolished the provision on the basis of two major 
points: (1) the need to protect the competence of Territorial Entities and (2) the obligation to 
preserve the rights of the society as well as the environment.   
 
The high court concluded that the Mining Code article limited the autonomy and 
competences of Territorial Entities and was inconsistent with procedural law. The Mining 
Code was not the appropriate law to regulate or affect the competences of Territorial Entities. 
This is because Territorial Entities competences can only be affected or regulated by a 
particular law (ley orgánica) which is almost at the same level of the constitution and its 
provisions shall remain permanent in the time. The Mining code, in contrast, was passed as a 
law of lower category (ley ordinaria) into the Congress.217 Subsequently, the Mining code 
could not abolish and took over the competences of a law of higher hierarchy i.e. ‘ley 
orgánica’218. One of the main reasons for this special protection is that the Congress when is 
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regulating the competences of Territorial Entities by a ‘ley orgánica’ makes a stronger and 
robust democratic process (for example absolute majority) than when is issuing a ‘ley 
ordinaria’ (Mining code.)219 
 
In addition, another pivotal point of the High Court to abolish the provision of the Mining 
Code was that the Central Government through the national mapping mining activity can 
impact the competences of Territorial Entities to regulate the economic activity of their 
territories.  
 
Environmental care and society rights supported also the decision to abolish the Mining Code 
provision. Taking into account a former judgment (C-123/2014), the Court interestingly 
reaffirmed that during the licensing mining process the Central and the Local Government 
shall harmonise their interests and agree measures to protect the environment; the water 
reservoirs; the sustainable development of communities; the constitutional rights of 
indigenous people; the individuals; the economic activity of territories; and lastly but not less 
important it should preserve the autonomy of the Territorial Entities.220  
 
In conclusion, until May 2016, one should arguably conclude that the Central Government 
and Local Governments shall first make efforts to reach an agreement on the measures of 
environmental protection and sustainable development during the process of issuing a mining 
right.221 If there is still a collision of competences between both entities (no settlement), the 
Congress shall then resolve the controversy by issuing a particular law (ley organica).  
 
5.4. Stage 3 - The state of the art: people are choosing but do they have the last world? 
 
Strikingly, in August 2016, the Constitutional High Court made a new judgment where 
expressly gave the power to Territorial Entities to forbid mining projects as part of the 
communities right to be consulted where there is an initiative of developing a mining project. 
Therefore, this sub-chapter will explain how the Social License to Operate could be accepted 
or rejected through popular consultations.  
 
There has been a constitutional shift in Colombia which is best encapsulate by the following 
quote: “The former constitution declared that sovereignty rested on the Nation while the new 
one states that sovereignty lies on the People”.222 This further supports the use of popular 
consultations to define the economic activities of territories. For instance, Cajarmarca’s 
people opted for agricultural activities instead of gold whilst Cumaral’s people opted for 
stockbreeding of livestock instead of hydrocarbons. However, are these outcomes legally 
binding? This subsection considers legal cases that have arisen. 
 
Popular consultation’s outcome is binding and they are enforceable by law. From 1994, the 
authorities are obliged to respect the results of popular consultation. Indeed, Territorial 
Entities are particularly obliged to conduct a popular consultation when a mining project 
transforms the economic activity of a territory.223 However, what is a popular consultation 
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and why its outcome is binding? Popular consultation is a constitutional citizen democratic 
right224, in which, the people express their consent or not regarding to a specific question that 
is related with affairs of the Central or Local level, respectively.225 If the outcome in the polls 
is positive, another public entity is obliged to adopt the people’s decision in an independent 
law which can be subject of further constitutional analysis.  Therefore, the people’s decision 
in a popular consultation is binding on the basis of the fulfilment of the minimum legal 
requirements.226  
 
Particularly, the outcome of popular consultations in mining projects are binding not only by 
law but also because the hazards that mining projects can have on the environment and 
society. In August 2016, the Constitutional Court in a judgment issued in August 2016  –
‘Liliana Mónica Flores Arcila’ against ‘Tribunal Administrativo del Quindío’227- confirmed 
the binding and enforceability of these actions regarding a specific popular consultation 
against mining activities (Pijao municipality). Two main reasons supported the decision. 
First, the binding nature of the people’s decision as was explained in the paragraph above, 
and, second, the need to protect specific rights (agricultural workers and the environment) 
against the almost certain damages that result from mining activity228. In the judgment 
mentioned above, the Constitutional Court declared that mining activities affect significantly 
communities rights; the supply and right to food229; the public order within one 
municipality230; other industries231; the environment of the municipalities; and the economic 
industry of the territory.232  
 
Consequently, the Court233 expressly returned the decision-making power back to 
communities. As the development of a mining project can impact the competences of local 
territories and directly impacts local communities234, communities are entitled to participate 
and express its opinion about the allowance or not of mining activities235. Consequently, 
Territorial Entities are nowadays entitled to ban mining projects.236  
 
However, can this decision promote more adversarial and extreme positions between Central 
Government and Local Governments?  
 
As was explained in the stage 2, the same Constitutional Court (C-123/2014 and C-273/16) 
highlighted the cooperation principle between public entities as well as the procedural law 
(ley organica) to overcome any collision of competences to balance two tensions: on the one 
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hand, the need to allocate or spread the economic benefits of an extractive project in all the 
Colombian territories and, on the other, the need to preserve the self-governance of Local 
Authorities over their territories.237 Nonetheless, with the new judgment of the High Court 
(August 19 of 2016), Local Authorities are entitled to forbid the development of mining 
projects. Therefore, one should conclude that until a new bill is passed into the Congress, 
mining companies shall have a previous consent from the community to start exploration 
activities in one territory.   
  
Nowadays, there is government initiative to regulate at the earliest consultation to avoid 
eventual suspension of the Mining-Energy activity, as a result of some investors claiming for 
damages and legal stability.238 For example, TobieMining-Cosigo (Canada) filed an 
international arbitration claim of USD 16.500 million arguing that they have not received any 
compensation due to the impossibility to develop a mining right in the ‘Yaigojé-Apaporis’ 
natural reserve, which is a special protected area of 1 million hectares of virgin jungle and a 
sacred place for Indigenous people (origin of life)239. Additionally, AngloGold Ashanti has 
argued the need for having legal stability as a result of the decisions made by Local 
Authorities in which the latter have banned mining projects.240  
 
5.5. Gaining a Social License to Operate  
 
Generally, extractive industries develop their “Sustainable Development” or “Corporate 
Social Responsibility” (CSR) strategies under the concept that “without private sector wealth 
creation there can be no significant reductions in poverty”241. However, extractive industries 
arguably “often fail to emphasise why resource companies might want to contribute in such a 
way (poverty reduction)”242. 
 
In Colombia, contract law has become a quintessential device to perform social public policy 
and to deliver Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programs to reduce poverty with 
enormous investments. These social programs are performed trough inter-administrative 
agreements or by public and private association agreements with non-profit organisations. 
For instance, in 2012, two different memorandum of understanding were signed by the 
Colombian Central Government, the Mining Industry and the Hydrocarbons sector to 
overcome extreme poverty in Colombia under an ‘ethical and social mandate’ to tackle it243. 
Furthermore, from 2012 to 2016, the National Oil and Gas Company, Ecopetrol, had invested 
£ 261.866.750 in social investment programs in health, education, productive projects, 
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infrastructure and environmental care244 Despite this noticeable investment and this CSR’s 
strategies, communities and indigenous people are still protesting against extractive 
industries.245   
 
Harvey suggests a shift from ‘Outreach’ (particularly the bad-outreach) to ‘In-reach’ 
approach – see below in Table 4.246 Applying an out-reach approach imply that the Social 
License to operate is an external affair of the company. In contrast, an in-reach approach 
involves that the Social License to operate is a “business-connected” activity that it is in the 
business core. This shifting generates a change within the conventional transactional 
Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) or analogously concepts, from a transactional model 
of compensation or kind of gifts to a process where “trust”, “respect” and “local induction” 
are the main foundations of a lasting relationship between communities and industries247.  
 
One can restate Harvey’s key points in the following terms below in Table 4:  
 
   Table 4: Harvey’s In-reach and (Bad) Out-reach Approach 
In- reach approach Bad Out-reach approach 
 
• ‘Local Induction Course’ delivered by 
educators with high people participation should be 
a compulsory module to be taken by each 
employee of an Extractive Industry 
 
• Gaining the TRUST of communities: listening, 
thinking, discussing and learning from them 
 
• Showing respect to communities 
 
• Social Licence must be in the heart of Managers 
 
• Changing the behaviour of employees in 
extractive industries 
 
• Unilateral delivery of social programs that do 
not have a business connection 
 
• Transactional social investment as a manner 
of compensation 
 
• Delivery of gifts that create dependency and 
resentment 
 
• Social programs managed by third-parties 
non-aligned or not connected with the business 
 
   Source: Constructed by the Authors (2017).248 
 
Consequently, Harvey’s proposal is to create a kind of a partnering between the communities 
and the extractive industries to work “on a face to face basis” on the major concerns of the 
people; the goal is that these fears or issues are highly connected with business activity of the 
Company instead of being as an external affair. 
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Constitutionally, the regulation of the sub-soil and the governance of the surface is allocated 
in two public entities; the former (sub-soil) relies on the Congress which can delegate it to the 
Central Government whereas the latter (surface) relies on Territorial Entities. However, the 
Constitutional Court has challenged, in practice, this division mostly in the mining sector due 
to environmental concerns and the potential change of economic productivity in territories. 
 
This challenge arises due to the lack of coordination to govern the exploitation of non-
renewable natural resources inside the State, at both central and local levels. Therefore, this 
tension has likely activated the people’s sovereignty as a manner of solve this collision of 
competences249, which has been expressed through more than five popular consultations to 
forbid mining-petroleum activities and 44 intentions to follow the same tendency.  
 
The challenge now is to harmonise not only the competences of the State over the natural 
resources as well as to consider the people’s right to be considered in the decisions that may 
affect their territories. As a result, until the Congress introduce a new law (ley organica) 
solving the tension between the Central Government and Local Governments, one thesis is 
arguably emerging in Colombia: community consent is a condition to being awarded a 
mining right as well as a hydrocarbon license. Despite that there is not a legal provision that 
expressly requires community acceptance to exploit non-renewable natural resources, i.e. a 
“Social License to Operate” as an equivalent to the Environmental License, this consent will 
be required if there is a potentially impact or hazard that affect the society, the environment 
and the economic activity of one territory250. This consent can be achieved whether by a 
popular consultation promoted by communities or local authorities or by individual 
negotiation among the oil companies, the State and communities. 
 
However, there is also an important role that extractive industries and petroleum enterprises 
can develop in this scenario: self-regulation of their power.   
 
It seems reasonable to suggest that actually in Colombia the SLO should be the first point in 
the agenda in the ‘Check List’ of an Energy Project. The profitability of a project will be 
significantly affected by whether it obtains an SLO or not. For instance, 92 of Ecopetrol’s 
production wells were suspended in May 2017 due to community protests and other 81 
production wells also were ceased in June 2017 with a loss of 9.500 oil barrel per day 
because of an incident with indigenous people.251 Furthermore, Anglo Gold Ashanti has 
suspended operations in Cajamarca due to the outcome of the popular consultation.252  
 
Subsequently, it seems a fair suggestion that extractive industries and petroleum companies 
should have obtained and retained a “Social License to Operate” for the lifecycle of their 
projects; the same outcome will happen whether the company is under public or private 
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ownership. It is important that energy companies are more proactive on the SLO issue, and 
that they disclose, discuss and consider their interest to intervene a territory at the earliest 
stage possible of the project. Ensuring the company has an SLO before committing huge 
investments in exploration activities meet a company’s other obligations to sustainable 
development or corporate social responsibility, all key strategies for a company to realise 
when engaging in new energy activities. 
 
To restate, nowadays the society is entitled to accept or reject an extractive project in 
Colombia as a result of the disconnection inside the State. This participation right is 
supported by the Constitutional Court253 that returned the decision-making power back to 
communities until the Congress through a particular law will balance the tension of gaining 
royalties from the extractive industry to be allocated in all the Country or preserving the 





SLO is an emerging necessary tool for achieving effective and sustainable outcomes for both 
the extractive industries as well as affected communities.254 It needs a clearer definition to 
give it more prominence. The proliferation of terms that cover SLO’s as set out in table 1 
require consolidation. This would provide greater clarity in understanding the necessary role 
of SLO’s for energy companies. The increasing contractual nature of SLO’s leads us to the 
supposition that this consolidation is inevitable. Companies can no longer assume that the 
introduction of their activities will be perceived as uniquely benefiting communities in the 
form of financial incentives or employment.254 The SLO mechanism recognises that energy-
related industries and communities must enter into a deeper negotiated understanding as early 
as possible.  
 
The Colombia example raised in this paper demonstrates the risks in assuming that 
communities will accept readily energy-related activities undertaken by energy companies. It 
also points the important role played by courts or other intermediaries where rights of 
communities can usurp the needs of energy companies as we see in stage three of the 
Colombia study. The SLO can provide a helpful framework for avoiding international 
disputes if implemented in a comprehensive manner 255. It reminds us that the social and legal 
licence to operate cannot exist separately. They are unavoidably interconnected. An energy 
company must therefore consider both dimensions when proposing an energy project to avoid 
the experience outlined in Colombia or indeed in other Latin American countries. 256 Failure 
to do so will lead to similar outcomes to Colombia. 
 
The SLO is a key instrument for achieving energy justice.257 The foundational principles of 
distributional, procedural and recognition justice underpin the SLO framework. It demands a 
more comprehensive appreciation of energy-related impacts as well as the preventative 
measures needed for successful mitigation. The focus of these principles is not to thwart 
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energy activities. 258 It is to ensure the long-term sustainability of energy investments. The 
ignorance of energy justice principles results in short-term unstable negative experiences with 
resisting communities. 259 The contractual nature of a SLO can embed a two-way 
understanding of a fair and meaningful interaction between the energy company and the 
community leading to mutual benefits. 260 The increasing level of energy investments makes 
this process invaluable. 
 
Procedural justice is enhanced through the application of a SLO. The establishment of 
mechanisms for allowing community engagement with energy companies is in keeping with 
the demands of a wide range of legal interventions in this area, the most prominent being the 
Arhus convention. This reminds us that the participation of affected communities in decisions 
made by energy companies must be accompanied by the right to access relevant information 
as well as ultimately recourse to justice in environmental matters. We highlighted the 
expansion of such rights through the consideration of impact assessment within a European 
context. In order to come in line with such advances, the SLO must reflect on all dimensions 
when considering what procedural justice means. 261 
 
The second component of energy justice is the adoption of a comprehensive approach to 
human rights. We outline above the ways in which such recognition could be expanded 
further when considering the implications of a given energy project. The current approach is 
to adopt the existing FPIC framework which remains too narrow in focus. Human rights must 
be considered more widely than indigenous considerations, as well as over the lifetime of a 
project (instead of the current “rubber stamp” understanding). The Voluntary Principles on 
Security and Human Rights offers a more private company mechanism (rather than the state 
centric perspective of FPIC). This is a step in the right direction. A robust understanding of a 
SLO could further enhance this approach by expanding such considerations throughout the 
life-cycle of a company’s energy activities. 
 
Distributional justice is a final consideration in our paper. It is a common principle 
established in the energy justice literature. It often argues for the redistribution of benefits for 
affected communities. We argue that the standardisation of SLO terminology, alongside its 
increasingly contractual nature, could help communities understand where SLO’s have been 
successfully enacted. Its current opacity hinders the adoption of best practice. The current use 
of multiple terms leads to an unawareness of its potential for both companies and 
communities. This has led to an unequal distribution of rights to access SLO as a useful 
mechanism for avoiding the dispute. Individual components of the SLO framework are 
currently implemented in a piecemeal approach. To achieve distributional justice, we must 
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